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Abstract: 
Contemporary theorists of constituent power recognise a tension in which the omnipotent 
novelty of constituent power is necessarily policed by constituted power. Beginning with Arendt’s 
claim that the categories of constitutional stability and political novelty should be thought together 
rather than treated as oppositional, this article presents an interpretation of her work that seeks to 
address this ‘paradox of constitutionalism’. Whilst commentators have come to assert that Arendt 
repudiates ‘absolutes’ in favour of an account of ‘relative beginnings’, this article demonstrates that 
Arendt’s argument involves a critical redescription of the absolute, rather than a repudiation. This 
is significant, for it illuminates the manner in which her account of founding seeks to dismantle 
the commonplace temporalisations we attribute to our political vocabulary. This is employed to 
argue that particular stylings of absolutes naturalise the appearance of the new only as temporal 
ruptures, allowing us to get a handle upon the paradox of constitutionalism, and to think 
tentatively beyond this paradigm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the final chapter of On Revolution, in which she draws attention to the lost treasures of 
the revolutionary tradition, Hannah Arendt writes that ‘the spirit of revolution contains two 
elements which to us seem irreconcilable’. The experience of founding brings forth an 
‘exhilarating awareness of the human capacity of beginning’, an exhilaration which is tempered 
through a pressing concern with the ‘stability and durability of the new structure’. That in our 
contemporary political vocabulary we recognise stability and the spirit of the new as opposites is ‘a 
symptom of our loss’.1  This loss is especially germane to the apparently perplexing relation 
between constituent and constituted powers in contemporary constitutional thought.  
Across its diverse formulations, constituent power has recently been framed as a 
‘paradoxical’ concept. Emmanuel Sieyès, writing in the formative years of the French Revolution, 
did not see the concept as paradoxical. The Nation, as the rightful body to draw up the new 
constitution of France, was the constituent power, though this power was only enacted through a 
complex account of representation intended to temper the unbridled ethical will that was later 
seen in the Terror.2 The treatment of constituent power in contemporary thought, however, has 
reneged on of Sieyès’ fateful insights. For a number of contemporary writers, constituent power 
evokes a pressing tension between the generative and expansive constituent power of the people, 
and the necessity to divide and constrain it if it is to offer up a viable constitutional form.3 By 
interpreting constituent power as ‘paradoxical’, these theorists come to read the concept through 
the theoretical lens that Arendt wishes to critique, for the founding act is bracketed into two 
opposed elements: the intense novelty of constituent power against the stability of constituted 
powers. Though their conclusions differ, this conceptual framework organises the positions of 
theorists as diverse as David Dyzenhaus and Antonio Negri. For liberal constitutionalists like 
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Dyzenhaus, constituent power must immediately give way to a stable constituted power, and with 
it the rule of law, once the moment of founding has passed.4 Negri, who seeks to move beyond the 
tension, celebrates the radical freedom of a constituent power that remains permanently in excess 
of constitutional form.5 The effort to stabilise the constitutional order necessarily implies an 
execrable containment of the creative potential of the multitude. Despite their unalloyed political 
differences, each of these theorists retains the antagonistic relation’ between stability and novelty, 
with implications for the conceptual relation between politics and law, for the innovation or 
unruliness of ‘the political’ is positioned against the surety of the symbolic order of law.  
This article takes up Arendt’s assertion that to recapture the lost spirit of revolution consists 
in ‘the attempt at thinking together and combining meaningfully’ the opposed temporalities of 
stability and novelty.6 Others have undertaken similar tasks by focusing upon her council system, 
though this has amounted to a theorisation of the persistence of constituent power within the 
constituted order.7 It is vital also to consider this in the act of founding itself if the opposition is to 
be challenged effectively. In order to do so, this article re-examines the political temporality that is 
evoked in the activity of founding. This is developed with attention to her account within The Life 
of the Mind, where she revises her position from On Revolution. Here she confronts what she calls 
‘the riddle of foundation’, or, ‘how to restart time within an inexorable time continuum’.8  The 
new always emerges within a world that preceded it in time, and so appears to disrupt our received 
understanding of stability. In constitutional theory, this tension is augmented by a peculiar 
superhuman need to begin political life with a new calendar. This, Arendt recognises, is achieved 
most readily through appeals to extra-temporal absolutes that, in mimicking divine genesis, undo 
the human achievement of founding.9 Within this article, I argue that Arendt’s response is not to 
repudiate absolutes in politics but instead to offer a critical redescription of them.  Rather than a 
‘resolution’ to the riddle, her response is more appropriately framed as a ‘disruption’ to the 
commonplace temporalisations we attribute to our political vocabulary, allowing us to approach 
the relationship between stability and novelty as compatible rather than antagonistic ideas. In 
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doing so, we are more appropriately placed to navigate the conceptual make-up of the paradox of 
constitutionalism and theorise an alternative relation between constituent power and 
constitutional form. 
This argument is built in three parts. In part I, I parse three distinctive readings of the 
Arendtian account of founding, arguing that they each employ absolutes as tools of political 
theology, a position which has important implications for the manner in which they relate politics 
to law.10 This is problematic for two reasons: first, this retains the bifurcation between stability and 
novelty, and second, through this manner of thinking it imports a thin conception of law as 
command into their argument. Whilst Arendt certainly does employ the term ‘absolute’ in this 
manner, it is by no means exhaustive. Greater sensitivity to her other uses highlights that she does 
not exclusively consider them tools of political theology. The significance of this is developed in 
part II, in which I argue that her Augustinian reflections on a predicament of beginning anew in 
Kant’s First Critique illuminates the limitations of a conventional manner of understanding 
beginnings as a rupture in time. I develop this theme in part III by critiquing the temporal 
vocabulary employed by the paradox of constitutionalism. Arendt also leaves open the possibility 
of considering how temporality weighs upon our actions. By reading her thoughts on the 
temporality of the thinking ego against her position on the temporality of action, one possibility is 
that our mental reflections on time disentangle our actions from commonplace assumptions of 
linear continuity, so disrupting our association of the new with rupture. This strategy of disrupting 
the temporalities we associate with political action assists in reconsidering the ‘paradoxical’ relation 
between constituent and constituted powers, by challenging the theoretical lens through which a 
constituent power is made necessary. 
 
THE PROBLEM OF THE ABSOLUTE 
Arendt’s reflections on revolutionary beginnings have an ambiguous relation with the term 
‘absolute’. She is deeply troubled with the manner in which they are employed as recourse to God, 
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for power within a political realm attentive to human plurality can never amount to omnipotence.11 
Such omnipotence, as is found in her considerations of sovereignty and totalitarianism, compresses 
the space between humans destroying their capacity to act and to begin.12 And yet, she nevertheless 
recognises their importance in the case of laws by which political communities are founded.13 
Whilst she affirms that ‘the absolute…spells doom for everyone’ when it enters the political 
realm’,14 she celebrates the absolute that is engendered in the principium.15  
Andreas Kalyvas has recently sought to overcome this tension by dismissing Arendt’s use of 
the terms ‘altogether new’ and ‘absolute novelty’ as ‘misleading expressions’, in favour of an 
account of a ‘relative beginning’.16 Whilst his reading is insightful, I am unconvinced that one can 
write off Arendt’s language so straightforwardly. Arendt’s choice of words strikes me as more 
ambiguous; whilst she wishes to refute a groundless will, she does not subsume the absolute under 
this term, but applies the word ‘absolute’ in manners that pull in different directions. Attentiveness 
to this is integral to the manner Arendt relates novelty to stability rather than treating them as 
countervailing tendencies. On occasion, she employs the term ‘absolute’ as a noun, which stand in 
for authority by appearing as a transmundane object, whilst on others, when for example she talks 
of ‘absolute novelty’, it is employed as an adjective that modifies the intensity of the novel act. 
There is, in addition, an important interaction effect between these two employments if the 
mundane intensity of an ‘absolute beginning’ is betrayed when it appeals to a transmundane or 
divine absolute. This is evident if we take two examples. The first is clearest in her polemic against 
Emmanuel Sieyès.17 It is the substitutional problem of conferring upon the Nation the authority 
that they might act as a stand-in for the divine absolute: the positing of a ‘Creator-god who creates 
time along with the universe and who as legislator remains outside His creation’.18 The great virtue 
of this mode of the absolute was to be found in its ability to break the vicious circle of law-making 
for the political temporality of the divine absolute locates the Will beyond the temporal realm 
altogether, residing ‘in’ eternity. The second is the temporal absolute of rupture—that is, an 
absolute break with the past. This, she refers to as an ‘absolute beginning’. It is, however a more 
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problematic construction for it encapsulates this tension between the mundane and transmundane 
employments of ‘absolute’. In utilising ‘absolute’ as an adjective, it qualifies the action in such a 
way as the absolute appears to be generated by the act itself. Nevertheless, this appears to be 
betrayed for though it does not cite God directly, it nevertheless imitates his capacity to create time 
itself. In doing so, one destroys the distinctive temporality of politics as the will overrides the other 
faculties of the mind, allowing the actor to believe in the unthinkable, that Man born in time could 
restart it.19 
Each of these engage in what Michael Freeden has recently referred to as the ‘arrogance and 
arrogation of politics’—that those political decisions that claim finality do so unduly by 
appropriating authority from elsewhere. Ostensibly conclusive decisions endeavour to occupy a 
‘godly role of boundary setting’ in the commencement of political time, which corresponds to the 
‘finality of initiation’ in order to control the trajectory of political life.20 This practice of political 
arrogation is vital to Arendt’s critique of the unwieldy uses of absolutes within politics. They 
secure the foundation through the imitation of a transmundane principle allowing secular 
government to retain the political instruments of Christian political theology.21 In section two, I 
will argue that theologico-political absolutes are not exhaustive of Arendt’s thought on the subject. 
It first serves to examine the consequences that follow when treated as if they were. In order to do 
so, I take three distinctive readings of Arendt’s constitutional founding. These are Bonnie Honig’s 
Derridean rereading, Andreas Kalyvas’s account of ‘relative beginnings’ and Mark Wenman’s 
affirmation of constituent power as absolute rupture. What remains intact in each account is an 
employment of ‘absolutes’ as tools of political theology. In treating absolutes in this fashion, each 
of them persists with a theorisation of law as a symbolic order that is ‘against’ politics. As such they 
each conceptualise the relation between politics and law inadequately. The implication is an 
inability to consider the categories of novelty and stability together in the manner in which Arendt 
calls for.  
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In her impressive comparative reading of Arendt’s On Revolution with Jacques Derrida’s 
Declarations of Independence, Bonnie Honig identified in Arendt an attempt to address the question 
of how to ‘establish lasting foundations without appealing to gods, a foundationalist ground, or an 
absolute’.22 In place of an appeal to an extrapolitical source of authority, Honig places stress an act 
of performative writing that is the most exemplary form of being-in-the-world; the ‘we hold’ of 
the declaration was the actualisation of freedom in action, that ‘requires no appeal to a source of 
authority beyond itself’.23 Against this, she contrast Derrida, who demonstrates the ‘we hold’ of 
the declaration to be caught up in the undecidability of the constative utterance of a people who 
are yet to come into being. Her solution is neither to deny nor succumb to the constative moment 
of founding, but instead calls for Arendt to ‘resist’ this undecidability.24  In appealing to resistance, 
Honig sets up the initial intervention into the problem of the absolute. Absolutes are illicit because 
they are irresistible, though the peculiar undecidability may be exploited in order to resist the 
irresistible absolute. This ‘resistance’, however, reworks the relation between law and politics. 
Though it resists the act of putting the law of laws above humankind, law remains associated with 
the divine command that nevertheless holds the absolute in its place as a ‘law of laws’.25 This is the 
heritage of the Derridean strand of Honig’s interpretation for which absolutes, like constative 
utterances, are structural necessities of our language that cannot simply be abandoned.26 This has 
pressing implications for the Arendtian activity of augmentation, for there are acute differences 
between the Arendt and Derrida. For Arendt, augmentation, derived from the Roman conception 
of law as an alliance, is an activity of ‘adding to the original foundation’ through which law and 
politics appear together as mutually compatible categories.27 The Derridean undecidability, 
however, undoes this compatibility for he conceives of law as command.28 This is not to diminish 
the innovation of Honig’s interpretation, but rather place emphasis upon the manner in which her 
Derridean inflection configures the relation between law and politics, for the structure of resistance 
is not only a resistance against the absolute, but a resistance against the law. The deconstructive 
move converts augmentation, an activity of ‘being-alongside’, into resistance, that is, as ‘being-
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against’.29 Stability and novelty are agonistically related in a precarious, open-ended struggle 
between politicisation and depoliticisation.30 Though the opposition is transformed into a 
generative tension, stability nevertheless remains antithetical to the spirit of the new.  
More recent revisionary interpretations of On Revolution have challenged Honig’s 
breakthrough reading. Andreas Kalyvas takes Honig’s reading to task, instead arguing that 
Arendt celebrates the American revolutionaries who were able ‘to avoid the language and practices 
of absolute rupture’ that a purely performative politics entails, for they relied upon pre-existing 
contracts, charters and self-governing public bodies, thus escaping the ‘lawlessness and power 
vacuum that a complete break would have necessarily created’.31 Through the ‘relative’ nature of 
beginning in On Revolution, he argues, Arendt’s story of the American founding drew its strength 
from the ability to remain in continuity with the preceding democratic culture of the colonies. 
While this was an instance of ‘extraordinary politics’, no absolute beginning arose for authority 
was derived from the legal traditions and institutions that persisted. Though Kalyvas’s 
interpretation offers the critical insight that a thread of temporal continuity remains, this is styled 
as a legal continuity in order to avoid the proximity to Carl Schmitt by ‘repudiating the notion of 
an ex nihilo beginning’.32 There is certainly good reason to think Arendt is replying to Schmitt,33 
though this need not be so straightforward as a repudiation of absolutes, and the inversion of 
Schmitt’s argument. To suggest this is the case is troublesome for it tempers the manner in which 
Arendt rethinks the significance of law. For Kalyvas, the appropriate action is to take guidance 
from existing laws, and not to throw oneself into the abyss of freedom. A relative beginning 
ensures that the absolute does not emerge, but only in this instance, a position enhanced by his 
emphasis upon the exceptionally good laws of colonial American. The absolute, as the spectre of a 
Schmittian conception of commandment, remains conspicuous in its absence, for it is excluded 
from the particular case though not overcome generally, and so Kalyvas’s thesis retains the 
phenomenological makeup that associates law with stability, and politics with the new, though a 
new inflected with decisionism. To escape this decisionism, the novelty of politics is subordinated 
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to the law through which it is harnessed and contained.34 Rather than an antagonistic relation, or 
an agonistic struggle, politics is inscribed within the law though the distinctive conceptual 
functions of each are retained. 
It is for this reason that Mark Wenman has celebrated what Arendt recognises as the ‘specific 
revolutionary pathos of the absolutely new’.35 Noting Kalyvas’s effort to advocate only ‘relative 
beginnings’, Wenman has interpreted Arendt’s argument instead as an endorsement of a form of 
action that manifests in the ruptural temporality of radical innovation.36 On his account, that 
Arendt keeps alive this connection between constituent power and temporal rupture is precisely 
what separates her thought from her agonistic heirs. Wenman wants to take Honig’s 
interpretation without its Derridean gloss. Instead, by placing the stress upon the ‘absolute priority’ 
of constituent power as revolutionary rupture he interprets Arendt as ‘stress[ing] unequivocally 
the moment of radical innovation’ which he connects with an absolute beginning.37  Whilst 
Wenman reads Arendt as opening up an abyss of freedom, he suggests she does so only by radically 
rupturing the historical time continuum. Though he appreciates the phenomenological 
importance of the act of founding, the insightful distinction that he sketches between constituent 
power as revolution and augmentation, along with his preference for the former, urges us to 
engage in a politics that does not concede to the closure of law. In order to do so he styles this 
rupture in the form of a messianic break.38 That is to say, for Wenman theologico-political 
absolutes are necessary to overcome the law and mobilise the brand of militant cosmopolitanism 
he demands. 
None of this is intended to diminish the innovation of their readings, for the positions of 
Wenman, Honig and Kalyvas strike upon crucial elements of Arendt’s thought, though I wish to 
emphasise that in utilising absolutes as theologico-political tools, they are encouraged to think of 
law and politics as opposed categories, and so cannot get a handle upon a complementary relation 
between novelty and stability. In the process of doing so, the temporal experience of founding is 
drawn in one of three ways; it is either a continuity with the past, a radical break from it, or an 
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agonistic struggle against the despotic though stabilizing absolute. Each of these readings lead us 
back into the paradox of constitutionalism, for the temporal lens through which they approach 
founding associates constituent power’s novelty with a political break, and stability of constituted 
power with continuity.  
 
OF RELATIVE ABSOLUTES 
The term ‘absolute’ plays a far more distinguished role in Arendt’s account of constitutional 
founding than has thus far been acknowledged. In attending to it, we can appreciate that it is 
precisely this common distinction, which maps continuity on to stability and associates rupture 
with radicality, that Arendt reworks. In addition to these theologico-political uses, there is another 
‘absolute’ which conceives of temporality of founding differently. Here, Arendt establishes the 
grounds for a peculiar construction she refers to as ‘relatively absolute spontaneity’, which she 
employs to critically rewrite the valence of the term ‘absolute’ in order to reintegrate it into her 
political vocabulary by scrambling the terms of temporal experience in modern Western thought 
that bind novelty to futurity and rupture. This appropriately frames her characterisation of the 
absolute as it applies to the establishment of principles in and of politics. The purpose of this is to 
undo what both Honig and Kalyvas, in their own ways, take to be the despotic moment of the 
absolute that places the law above and against politics. This oblique argument can be discerned if 
one first appreciates that through her often experimental and eclectic writing the meaning and 
valence of words such as ‘authority’, ‘foundation’ and ‘absolute’ shift radically. She exploits this 
strategy of reading as a means of disrupting the commonplace distinctions that the political 
vocabularies of the ‘Western tradition’ attribute to absolutes.  
As a way into this disruption of our temporal register, Arendt considers Kant’s 
‘embarrassment’ in dealing with the problem of bringing something new into a world already in 
motion. There is an apparent tension in which Kant describes a chain of causation beginning in 
the moment he rises from his chair. In doing so, she quotes Kant, a new series has ‘an absolute 
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beginning in this event, although as regards time this event is only the continuation of a preceding 
series’.39 What is ‘so very troublesome’ is the ‘notion of an absolute beginning, for “a series occurring 
in the world can have only a relatively first beginning, being always preceded by some other state 
of things”’.40 This is to suggest a perplexing tension is in place between the act being at once relative 
and absolute. In rising from a chair, the act can be said to be an ‘absolute beginning’ insofar as 
causality is concerned, if not time, for though time does not begin anew, something new is initiated 
in willing that act.  Despite this, due to our received relation between causation and temporality, 
it is not at all straightforward whether such a beginning can be interpreted as an ‘absolute 
beginning’. Kalyvas has taken this passage to indicate a reproach on Arendt’s behalf of Kant’s 
failure to distinguish absolute from relative beginnings, in order to affirm his interpretation of her 
as a theorist of the latter.41 This, however, seems to paper over precisely the temporal difficulty at 
stake, for she does not turn to Kant in order to resolve the problem of willing, but to prise it open. 
It is certainly the case that humans cannot commence time anew as if they were gods though it 
diminishes the thrust of Arendt’s account of the will and of action, each with their ‘miraculous’ 
qualities,42 if the beginning is treated as only relatively new. The discussion points to something 
more profound. The manner in which we take for granted the appearance of the new within 
politics does not so much conflate temporality with causation, but privileges the former over the 
latter. Our common sense dictates that the absolutely new is not only unprecedented, but that it 
attains its unprecedented significance by appearing ex nihilo, and so a problem follows: the 
absolutely new may only emerge as an event unconnected with the past, an activity that, short of 
an arrogative gesture to the tools of political theology, is beyond the scope of human action. In 
doing so, it also naturalises the phenomenological opposition between novelty and stability, in 
which the absolutely new appears only as a punctuated temporal break that, insofar as is it is to be 
perceived as an absolutely new event, must break from that which existed before.  
Rejecting the absolutely new in favour of a relative beginning does little to address this 
naturalised opposition. It is, however, possible to identify an attempt on Arendt’s behalf to 
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redescribe the temporality and valence of an absolute beginning in order to square this difficulty. 
In Augustine, she finds a distinction between two beginnings, the principium of heaven and earth, 
and the initium of humankind, a distinction that points to the phenomenon that Kant draws 
between those temporally absolute and relative beginnings.43 Arendt returned to this distinction 
often throughout her body of work, and the employment is significant for not only does she 
consider him the only philosopher who, through this distinction, adequately explains Genesis in a 
manner sensitive to the human capacities to begin, but in doing so he sufficiently complicated the 
relation between what we take to be relative and absolute beginnings. Though principium 
amounted to the beginning of the world and time, time only became meaningful through the 
initium of humankind without whom the movement of time was unthinkable. Prior to the creation 
of humankind, time turned in a ‘purposeless way’, and so it was for the ‘sake of novitas…that man 
was created’.44 Whilst principium may readily have been called the ‘absolute’ beginning in the 
Kantian manner, in that it successfully commenced time, that time was created in principio is of 
only relative consequence, for the new only attained its meaning as a beginning in relation to the 
initium of Man who could conceive of time in a purposeful fashion. The vital point, as Arendt 
recognises in a footnote to her discussion of natality, is that Augustine’s notion of principium has a 
‘much less radical meaning’ than the standard translation of the bible’s first verse.45 This evaluation 
more appropriately frames the phrase that she often quoted from City of God that demonstrates 
the enormous capacity of humankind to act as beginners, ‘that there was a beginning [initium], 
man was created before whom nobody was’.46 The capacity to begin does not follow from a 
humankind created in God’s image, or the arrogation of a god-like capacity as a Schmittian 
decision might, nor does it imply Scotian univocity.47 Rather, it was with initium, and not 
principium that a new event was made intelligible as a beginning which, in accordance with her 
conception of human plurality, could be meaningful only when recognised as one by humans who 
perceive time by breaking the temporal continuum into tenses. 
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This clarification is crucial, for it reveals the manner in which Arendt’s account of natality 
is geared in The Life of the Mind toward disrupting our sense of the absolute beginning as it appears 
in Kant. The predicament that Kant cannot square between an absolute causal beginning and a 
relative temporal beginning is seemingly dealt with in Arendt’s argument by inverting the relation 
between them. The creation of time, in Arendt’s interpretation of Augustine, is not ontologically 
superior to the creation of man within time, for the former, principium, can only be fully 
comprehended following the latter, initium. That is to say, in Augustine’s philosophy, there is an 
intensity to the human will vis-à-vis creation that is not found elsewhere in the philosophical 
tradition with which she is concerned. Arendt continues that had Kant known of Augustine’s 
philosophy of natality, he might have recognised that ‘the freedom of a relatively absolute 
spontaneity is no more embarrassing to human reason than the fact that men are born’.48 At the 
heart of this claim is a peculiar construction. To say an act is ‘relatively absolute’ is contradictory, 
though it reveals the sort of ontological bracketing she wishes to challenge. The grave problem, 
for Arendt, is that the very hypothesis of the absolute beginning goes back to the biblical doctrine 
of Genesis in which the beginning is bound to principium, and so the vocabulary of the absolute is 
always interpreted through, and judged against the standard of ex nihilo creation. Such, however, 
necessarily encloses the absolute within the confines of a divine will. As Kant examines the idea of 
the absolute beginning, he too renders it meaningful only by judging it against the principles of 
biblical genesis.49 It is in Augustine that Arendt finds the tools to unhook this commonplace 
relation. This contradictory construction of the ‘relative absolute’ in contradistinction to the divine 
absolute cuts to the heart of Arendt’s dilemma. The divine absolute is wholly inattentive to the 
fragile human capacity to begin anew. Not only is it wholly inaccessible to human action short of 
an arrogative gesture of imitation, but it also frames human activity in partial or relative manner, 
so diminishing its reception. In contrast, the ‘relative absolute’ captures the human capacity of 
beginning ‘absolutely’. That is to say, her position does not amount to a repudiation of the absolute, 
but the recovery of an alternative manner of employing that is sensitive to human plurality.  
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This excavation from Willing appropriately frames an otherwise abstruse comment in On 
Revolution, in which Arendt offers the affirmative statement that the search for an extra political 
absolute that might break the vicious circle of lawmaking is ‘futile’ for ‘this absolute lies in the very 
act of beginning itself’.50 She relates this to the concept of the principle which is the ‘solution to the 
otherwise unsolvable problem of an absolute in the realm of human affairs’.51 Like the lost Roman 
auctoritas, principles are critical for politics insofar as they establish criteria for normative 
judgement.52 In recognising the principle as the absolute that lies in the act of beginning, Arendt 
draws an elementary distinction not between absolute and relative beginnings, but divine and 
worldly absolutes that map on to the two Augustinian capacities to begin.  
When understood in this way I am not encouraged, as George Kateb is, to understand the 
principle as that which ‘comes to one from outside and inspires “from without”’, for it then appears 
to us as quasi-transcendental normative standard that derives its binding force from its location 
outside of the world.53 Conversely, Lucy Cane’s insight that the principle comes into being through 
cycles of repetition and regeneration, though agreeable, diminishes the ‘event-character’ Arendt 
associates with the relatively absolute beginning.54 The temporality projected by initium intends to 
disrupt the contrasting of the two. Instead, the principle is closely related to the concept of archê, 
endowed with a particularly human capacity to begin. Though she recognised this to be typically 
associated with sovereign rule, Arendt wished to resume the lost etymological connection that 
splits the act of ruling from that of ‘setting in motion’.55 In recovering this ancient meaning of 
archê, Arendt affirms the thread of continuity between the act of initiation and the activity of ruling 
that is inaugurated. Ruling does not separate ruler from ruled by conceiving of the beginning as a 
temporal break between sovereign and subject, but conceives the activity of politics under a 
principle that, coeval with the beginning, ‘inspires the deeds that are to follow and remains 
apparent as long as the activity lasts’.56 In doing so, Arendt attends to the manner in which stability 
springs from the beginning, rather than emerging subsequently—in the activity of ruling—to 
suppress its novelty.57   
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There is a spatializing phenomenology of law that proceeds from this. Through the lens of 
principium, the beginning of law serves as a partitioning device that commences time and space, 
with the explicit purposes of securing the inside from the out and reducing politics to peace, an 
ability amplified by the command-authority emanating from the ‘power monopoly of the state’, 
itself an imitation of the divine creator who prohibits human actions through commandment.58 
The lens of initium, in conceiving of beginnings as activities sensitive to human plurality, 
conceptualises law differently. Insofar as the beginning is not conceived as a radically punctuated 
rupture in time and space, but an activity within time that is inaugurated and augmented, the 
creation of law serves not as a wall to separate one from another, but, in accordance with the 
Roman Lex, seeks formal relationships and ties between individuals.59 To this effect, Law served 
as a means of forging an alliance or rapport to relate things, in order to bring individuals face-to-
face.60 The spatial inflection of this is to see Lex not as the preservation of a space, but the reduction 
of distance between individuals in order to foster political interaction and forge a common world. 
The correlated effect is to conceive law alongside politics as complementary tools that augment the 
founding act.61 That is to say, the implication of the temporality associated with the relatively 
absolute beginning of initium is to alter one’s relation to law. Politics is not a disposition of being-
against the law, nor does Arendt contrast constituent with constituted power. This conceptual 
nesting is the legacy of interpreting the absolute beginning as principium.  
 
BEYOND THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE TEMPORALITY OF THE RELATIVE 
ABSOLUTE 
The overlooked, and relatively finely-tuned difference over the temporality Arendt 
associates with the term absolute is not only thoroughly relevant to her own account of political 
founding, but also allows us to get a handle upon the phenomenological make-up of the paradox 
of constitutionalism. Doing so appropriately situates her response in a manner that devises an 
account of founding that reconciles stability with the emergence of the new by disrupting our 
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common-sense temporalisations of these categories. Loughlin and Walker’s paradox of 
constitutionalism presents the elementary tension of modern constitutionalism in the relation 
between the people as constituent power and the constitutional form that they bring into being. 
The unconditionally generative constituent power of the people must, for it to successfully 
establish a constitutional regime, be ‘divided’ and ‘constrained’ through the instituting act.62 To 
frame the problem differently, constitutionalism appears paradoxical for it relates constituted 
power to the stability associated with legality and continuity, and constituent power with the 
punctuated novelty of politics.  
When Loughlin and Walker identified this problem in their 2007 volume, they presented 
four possible solutions.63  Irrespective of the political bearing ascribed to the constituent power 
under each thesis, the meaning and function of constituent and constituted powers are kept intact. 
In each instance, it is accepted that the latter captures and constrains the former in order to 
preserve—or police—politics. What goes unaddressed is the manner in which we are encouraged 
to view constitutionalism through the narrow scope of such a paradigm. The excavation of the 
problem of the absolute presents an elementary perspective as to why this is the case. By The Life 
of the Mind, Arendt seems to have recognised that the problem of the absolute cuts in both 
directions. It is insufficient to contend that the conventional manner of employing politico-
theological absolutes in politics undermines the activity of founding, for absolutes condition our 
politics irrespective of our appeal to them, insofar as they assist in organising the temporal relations 
within which our political language operates. So long as the activity of beginning is associated with 
pricipium in this manner, we anticipate that the emergence of the new can only have radically 
disruptive consequences, a claim that seems to hold even once the overt theologico-political 
connotations have been shed. This is illustrated in Andrew Arato’s recent efforts to move beyond 
the paradox of constitutionalism by developing a paradigm of ‘post-sovereign’ constitution-
making. Here the concept of constituent power is ‘de-dramatize[d]’ by conceiving of constitutional 
founding as a process of legal revision, though this activity nevertheless organises itself around the 
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familiar temporal clustering of law, stability and continuity in order to temper the unruly 
constituent power.64 The stability ensured by legal continuity is necessary so long as the activity of 
constituent power is conceived through the lens of a theologico-political absolute.  The corollary 
is that the elementary bracketing between stability and the new remains intact. Though this may 
provide a viable constitutional form, its solution to the paradox of constitutionalism is to invert the 
bifurcation through which stability is given preference over novelty in even the first instance. 
This diagnostic point demonstrates that it is not enough simply to reject or resists the concept 
of the absolute when conceiving of the activity of founding. So long as we associate the absolute 
beginning with temporal rupture—one that is imitative of the divine creation of the world—our 
vocabulary fosters conceptual bifurcations and ‘automatic thought-reactions’ that Arendt wished 
to do away with, bracketing off stability against novelty, by pairing them with continuity and 
rupture respectively.65 Practically, moreover, it only allows the radically new to appear in 
predictable ways, namely, as a break from the past. Arendt’s solution, at least by The Life of the 
Mind, is not an endorsement of ‘relative’ beginnings, for she would be led back into the problem. 
It is the notion of relatively absolute spontaneity that allows her to reconsider this. If it is to allow 
us to conceive of stability and novelty together, however, the temporal structure of this activity 
requires discerning. In reading her account of the temporality of the thinking ego against the 
temporality of action, a ‘relatively absolute’ beginning within time springs from creative reflection 
on the past, displacing assumptions of linear continuity that associate the new with rupture. This 
elaborates the finer points of difference between my interpretation of Arendt and Kalyvas’s 
‘relative beginnings’ thesis in order to demonstrate how this temporality can be put to work to 
reconsider the terms of paradox of constitutionalism. 
Toward the end of Thinking, Arendt returns to a parable by Kafka entitled ‘He’.66 Here she 
envisions the location of the thinking ego upon a ‘battleground’ between the forces of past and 
future. That they are ‘forces’ is pivotal to her conceptualisation of temporality, for each of them 
presses upon the mind in order to shape the world of the thinker. Passively, it is within this 
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rectilinear temporality that an individual life rises out of ‘natural’ life, characterised by cyclical 
time.67 Actively, however, the forceful nature of past and future operate as a springboard for 
innovation. This is clearest in her modification of the parable in which she dismisses the notion 
that the protagonist might ‘jump out of this world altogether’, for to do so would be to absolve past 
and future of their meaning.68  Rather, as the forces of past and future meet, his presence causes 
‘the stream of time to deflect from whatever its original direction’. The ensuing ‘third force’, 
having resulted from past and future whose origins are infinite, is projected diagonally from a 
point of origin in the present outward in an ‘infinite’ direction.69 The modification that Arendt 
draws is significant for two reasons. First, she identifies the location of the thinking ego within the 
world, rather than within the nunc stans of Christian philosophy, the thinking equivalent of the 
unreflexive theologico-political will of constituent power. Second, it is when situated within the 
world that the absolute condition of human creativity is affirmed. The diagonal force is a thought 
process that, building upon the mind’s location between past and future, reaches out into infinity, 
the avowal of the ontological intensity of thinking, an activity that gives rise to the absolutely new 
without transgressing the temporal continuum. 
Though this is characterised as ‘a perfect metaphor for the activity of thought’,70 one should 
be careful in bracketing it to this arena alone.71 The striking opposition between vita activa and vita 
contemplativa developed in The Human Condition was largely rethought by The Life of the Mind.72 
Thought is not a practice that occurs outside of the temporal world, but is one deeply connected 
to ‘experience’.73 Whilst the practice of thinking remains a solitary activity, the two additional 
faculties of the mind, willing and judging remain responsive to the realm of appearance.74 These 
three faculties were to be kept in correspondence to prevent what she saw as the perennial problem 
of the philosophic tradition—the retreat of the thinking ego.75 Critically, the relation between 
thought and action is a recursive one; to be puzzled by the temporality of founding is a perspective 
that confronts the life of the mind before it confronts the realm of appearance. Paul Ricoeur grasps 
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this reflexivity when arguing that ‘it is vita contemplativa which allows vita activa to understand 
itself and to reflect upon its own temporal condition’.76  
Certainly this interface between thinking and acting can be enlarged if her reflections upon 
Walter Benjamin are considered.77 For Benjamin, the past appears in the present not as 
‘homogenous, empty time’, but as jetztzeit, a moment pregnant with transformative potential, in 
which the past is received in order to amplify the creativity of action.78 Critically, for Arendt, this 
utilisation of the past involves a strategy of ‘citability’, which she distinguishes from 
‘transmissibility’. 79 Whilst the latter is the thread of narrative continuity that ties the past to the 
present through the authority of tradition, citability makes use of what she elsewhere calls a 
‘fragmented past which has lost its certainty for evaluation’.80 There is a timeliness to this 
appropriation of Benjamin for, like the loss of tradition, activities of founding throw us into a 
protean universe.81 Short of exceptional circumstances, when the founding of a new constitution is 
necessary the pre-existing political landscape is rarely capable of providing the requisite legitimacy 
to secure the founding, for if authority were intact there would be no need for a new constitution.82  
In the instance of founding, it is not enough to replace the security of tradition with what 
Benhabib calls ‘narrativity’ for this nevertheless remains within the conceptual frame of a 
transmissible past that can be utilised unproblematically.83 Kalyvas appears to have narrativity in 
mind when he turns to preceding laws to stabilise the founding. For him the narrative of legal 
continuity secures the grounding of the constitutional beginning, through which the old is in 
position to place ‘self-limitation and stability’ upon the new, operating in a manner not dissimilar 
to the transmissibility of tradition.84 Arendt’s Benjaminian offering presents a thought-practice 
that is a little more complex; after all, storytelling is only one aspect of what Arendt does.85 This, 
she combines with an experimental writing, which turns to the past to ‘pry loose the rich and the 
strange’.86 The Benjaminian gift of thinking poetically entails the playful combination of thought-
fragments in order to evoke novel and serendipitous experiences. Whilst Raluca Eddon suggests 
that one would be ‘hard-pressed to imagine a more effective neutralisation of the messianic 
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dimension of Benjamin’s thought’,87 she it fails to recognise the sophistication of Arendt’s move. 
Arendt reads Benjamin against Benjamin in order to disentangle the thought-fragment from its 
messianic-revolutionary surroundings. The ‘citability’ she identifies in Benjamin’s work is one that 
is bound neither to authorial intentionality nor a narrative totality. The cited thought-fragment 
might creatively misread the intention behind the cited act, though this is due to its essayistic 
styling of prising open the gap between past and future in order to give birth to a new beginning. 
This fleshes out her reflections on Kafka, for the act of beginning is not defined in opposition to 
the old. The passing of judgement upon these thought-fragments recovered from the past means 
that the old is transformed into the radically new through the practice of thinking—the deflection 
of both tenses into an infinite present. It raises the past to open the present up to the new: ‘the 
genuine picture may be old, but the genuine thought is new. It is of the present’.88  
There is good reason why we should be careful of this distinction between a transmissible 
and citable past, for when in Life of the Mind she reconsiders the American founding, Arendt 
recognises that the founding fathers were caught once again in the problem of temporality. She 
highlights that they ‘renege[d] on the very experience of freedom and novelty’ in seeking a 
justification for their actions ‘which will have to show the act as a continuation of preceding 
events’.89 A narrative resolution circumvents the riddle by ensuring all foundation is the re-
foundation of a prior political arena, so whilst it never confronts the problem of temporal boundary 
setting, it comes at a cost. In doing so, the Founding Fathers denied themselves the ‘hope of 
founding a new Rome’; instead they were forced to ‘repeat the primeval foundation and found 
Rome anew’.90 The subtle distinction drives to the heart of Arendt’s position. What is sure is that 
the absolutely new need not dismantle the old in order to attain it meaning, but whereas Kalyvas’s 
extraordinary politics, like Arato’s post-sovereign constitution-making, puts guides in place to 
ensure self-limitation, Arendt refuses this trope of the Western tradition. The former founds 
Rome anew by re-establishing the old in its image, the latter founds a new Rome by judging the 
new against the exemplar. The temporal difference between the two is acute—whilst the former 
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is bound to the past, the action of the latter draws from the past, though its action is not rendered 
meaningful through its relation to the past. The founding, whilst not a temporal beginning, could 
claim to be an act of ‘absolute novelty’ that initiates a new space in the world. It is not simply ‘the 
new as an improved re-statement of the old’.91  
It is here that a distinctive conceptualisation of political temporality emerges. Unlike 
process-driven activities, in which time appear to transition imperceptibly between tenses, the ‘gap’ 
that is opened in the present—the infinite diagonal generated when self-consciously located 
between the weight of past and future—represents a moment of unending possibility. It is here 
that we might locate this conception of ‘relatively absolute spontaneity’. This moment is by no 
means one that appears ex nihilo; it is not an emergence from sheer voluntarism but an absolute 
generated from an application of the three mental faculties in concert. In doing so, Arendt 
reconceptualises absolutes as tools that are not bound to political theology. In response to the 
Kantian predicament that events of this world can only have ‘relatively first beginnings’,92 these 
parables build upon Arendt’s Augustinian claim that men are born, ‘newcomers again and again 
in a world that precedes them in time’.93 The capacity to begin in a ‘relatively absolute’ manner 
respects the finitude of humankind, and the limitations upon our worldly capacity to begin. To act 
otherwise—to begin as if that beginning was ex nihilo is to invoke the very Schmittian tool of 
political theology, and with it, a troubling conception of law as command.94 By contrast, her 
reformulation of an ‘absolute’ activity retains the properly temporal experience of politics by 
experimentally retrieving from the past those imperfect thought-fragments that might be put to a 
new and innovative use to prise open an absolutely new beginning. To be sure, the absolutely new 
is not a straightforward continuation of past events for the past does not appear to the thinking 
ego as an unproblematic narration. It is a fragmented past that has lost it certainty. Jacques 
Taminiaux writes of Arendt, ‘it is the past itself that launches an appeal to the invention of the 
new…of a future way of inhabiting the world’.95 This requires clarification, for the past is only 
meaningful through experience of it. The past is ‘launched’ into the absolutely new only through 
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the interface of thinking and acting. The characteristically infinite trajectory of thought projects 
the past toward the initiation of a new act, through which the quality of the absolute is not to be 
established in its origin, but in its trajectory. By locating the will between past and future, the 
absolutely new emerges not as a break from the old but what Patchen Markell has called an agent’s 
‘attunement’ to the act’s character as an irrevocable event.96  The old is not the context from which 
the act breaks but the context that provides the tools for its amplification. 
In thinking through beginnings in this fashion, we go some way to addressing the paradox 
of constitutionalism, for it allows us to think through the will of the founding act differently. In 
place of the rigid distinction between constituent and constituted power, in which the former 
appears as an uncompromising willfulness against which all positive law falls silent,97 the will of 
Arendt’s founding has a reflexive character. By locating the will in the state of nature, Sieyès’ 
constituent power is absolved of its temporal bindings. If I am correct in the case that I have 
presented, it is not so much its intensity, but the detemporalisation and isolation of Sieyès’ 
constituent power that characterises its willfulness in an uncompromising manner. Doing so is 
precisely the imitative strategy of a theologico-political absolute to which Arendt wants to draw 
our attention.  Conversely, in Arendt the will is related to the constellation of human freedom, 
plurality and temporal finitude, and so whilst her reflexive account manifests in a resistance against 
any attempt to be commanded,98 it does not do so in an uncompromising manner that throws out 
of joint our experience of time. Arendt, rather, is attentive to the manner in which the will can 
reconcile novelty with stability, for it is not only located in time, but aware of that location. In 
doing so, one reflects upon the situation in order to take responsibility for the chain of events 
initiated. This is not to say that the will is self-limiting, but rather that, like archê, the new does 
not appear as a discrete or unencumbered moment but a trajectory that builds upon itself, in 
concert with law, in order develop upon stable grounds for politics.  
The critical point is that the concept of constituent power is absent from Arendt’s normative 
vocabulary, and with good reason.99 Constituent power is necessarily bound up with an unreflexive 
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modality of action that requires the pairing of a constituted power tasked with constraining the 
absolutely new. It is not enough to devise a relative conception of the will alone in order to escape 
the dilemmas associated with constituent power. Her solution is to correct the theoretical lens of 
the absolute through which the need for a constituent power manifested. The paradox is addressed 
by placing the relation between law and politics within a fundamentally different field of 
commitments. Consider, for example, the question over the illegality of the founding act, which is 
an alternative expression of the paradox of constitutionalism. In excluding the conceptual 
framework of constituent power through her redescription of the absolute, the relation between 
law and politics is conceived differently, as a mutually enabling, rather than antagonistic pairing. 
Arendt’s relatively absolute beginning is coeval with the spirit of the law engendered by the 
founding principle. One might say the founding act is already legal, as if it ‘anticipates’ the law 
that is inaugurated. Such a conclusion remains internal to the terms of the paradox.100 Rather, the 
legality of founding does not trouble Arendt for it already inappropriately conceives of the law as 
a ‘catalogue of prohibitions’ that primarily serve to partition the political from the non-political 
and the legal from the illegal.101 The Roman-inspired law to which Arendt appeal in On Revolution 
and The Life of the Mind does not commit to such spatial, temporal and legal boundaries.102 Like 
the relatively absolute beginning that occurs within the world, it is ultimately of little consequence 
that the act of founding occurs ‘outside’ of the law. What is of consequence is that the activity of 
founding, like the law, serves to connect, rather than to divide.  
 
CONCLUSION 
My reading of Hannah Arendt’s constitutional founding has sought to draw attention to an 
overlooked aspect of her argument. Within On Revolution, and, to a greater extent, the revisions 
to that argument in The Life of the Mind, Arendt is engaged not only in a theorisation of founding, 
but also a reconsideration of the political temporality that is associated with it. This is not, as has 
been argued by others, the celebration of legal continuity over the ruptural mood of the French 
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Revolution. Rather, I have argued that within the course of her argument, one can discern crucial 
elements through which she rewrites the meaning and valence of the term ‘absolute’ in order to 
disrupt the manner in which the absolutely new is associated with the commencement of time 
itself. This move is more than just a linguistic sleight-of-hand in attributing the term ‘absolute’ to 
an act that is only relatively new. Instead, the reworking is a phenomenological one that intends 
to disrupt the commonplace temporalities through which we associate creation with a decisionistic 
brand of political theology. The implicit intention in doing so is to alter the theoretical lens that 
relates the new to temporal origins, the lens through which the need for a constituent power 
manifests. 
The argument developed has presented two significant insights. First, I have sought to 
demonstrate that, when viewed from the perspective of temporality, the problem of the absolute 
may be employed as a diagnostic device in order to navigate the paradox of constitutionalism. 
Through this lens it is possible to see why the paradox of constitutionalism appears paradoxical for 
it naturalises an opposition between stability and novelty around which our political vocabulary 
clusters concepts. This is only because novelty is conceived through the ruptural temporality of 
principium. This is carried over into thinking about constituent power irrespective of any overtly 
theologico-political connotation attached to the concept. To this effect, the various possible 
formulations of the paradox of constitutionalism, whether a constituent power tempered by a 
constituted power, the question over the (il)legality of the founding act, or the people who are both 
creator and creation of the law, are each consequences of our thinking of the beginning as 
principium, through which we are encouraged to consider the new as a ruptural or ex nihilo 
beginning that institutes a temporal boundary, partitioning the political from the non-political, 
and the legal from the illegal. All of this requires a conceptualisation of political agency arrogated 
from God.  
Arendt’s wager is that humans are temporal creatures who recognise our finitude in the 
world. Although we try, humans are unable to begin as if we were God. The upshot of our being 
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hominem temporalem is that time is conceivable only in our presence. Arendt’s brilliant conclusion 
to this was to recognise the priority of the Augustinian initium over principium; correspondingly, 
beginnings are meaningful only in our reception of them. The important conclusion that follows 
is that we are not held captive by the picture of the theologico-political absolute, for though our 
whole vocabulary is shot through with temporal aspects we nevertheless have the capacity to 
rethink the manner in which temporality weighs upon our actions. Part three of this paper 
examined one way in which Arendt achieves this, through which the absolutely new event of 
initium emerges from the interface between thinking and acting that creatively draws from the 
past and projects into the future, one that is attentive and responsive to the world. This relatively 
absolute modality of founding is not only characterised by a reflexive formulation of the will, but 
also the political will’s relationship with law. In forgoing the aspects of division that are carried 
over from the account of principium, Arendt is able to conceive of law to a different end, namely 
as a rapport that enable and augments the connection between individuals. Once this aspect of her 
argument is discerned, a distinctive temporalisation of founding emerges that opens the possibility 
for a politics distinct from either what James Muldoon has called a ‘middle path’ between liberal 
constitutionalism and radical democracy,103 or Antonio Negri’s belittling depiction of a ‘perfectly 
conservative’ model of legal continuity and American exceptionalism that is ‘more appropriate to 
a neophyte that a Heideggerian philosopher’.104 Whether Arendt’s relatively absolute spontaneity 
conceives of a sufficiently radical politics for theorists of constituent power such as Negri is a 
question that can remain open. What is clear, however, is that her considerations of the problem 
of the absolute introduces an interpretive apparatus for considering political founding that prises 
apart the conventional associations of stability with ‘conservatism’ and novelty with ‘radicalism’. 
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